VENUEVERITAS

DEX EVIDENCE INTERFACE

GMX

Perpetuals DEXSynthetic

Onchain perpetuals protocol with bank vaults holding collateral and a two-phase request/keeper execution model.

Compare DEXsInspect evidence

How does this DEX actually work?

Structural flow from documented architecture — not a performance or safety claim.

  1. Trader

    Signs wallet transaction

  2. Frontend / integration

    Builds call to ExchangeRouter

  3. Onchain request

    Order/deposit stored; no oracle prices yet

  4. Keeper execution

    Keeper bundles signed oracle prices and executes

  5. Bank / vault contracts

    Only bank contracts custody tokens

  6. Settlement

    Positions and markets updated in DataStore

Where is collateral held?

Follow the path from wallet to settlement. Smart-contract custody is still custody risk.

  1. User walletUser wallet
  2. DepositExchangeRouter request
  3. VaultDepositVault / OrderVault / market banks
  4. Margin accountPosition state in DataStore
  5. SettlementOnchain settlement

Custody model: Smart-contract custody — Not labeled simply “non-custodial.” Unknown edges stay Unknown.

Key structural facts

Liquidity model
LP VAULT (GM / GLV market tokens)
Counterparty
Liquidity providers in market pools
Chain / settlement
Arbitrum · On-chain
Chains
Arbitrum, Avalanche, MegaETH

Traders vs pool; frozen orders protect against liquidity gaming

Who controls what?

Governance processes do not by themselves prove decentralized operational control.

Evidence still unresolved
  • Emergency pause: Unresolved

Operational admin

Roles that can change contracts, parameters, or day-to-day operations.

  • Upgrade / new logic contracts

    Controller RoleStore role grants (operational admin)

    Mechanism Deploy new handlers; grant roles — banks stay put

    Timelock GovTimelockController / Timelock

    Verified structured · 2026-08-30 · Source

  • Parameter / fee config

    Controller Config via ConfigTimelockController

    Mechanism Timelocked config updates (operational + governance paths)

    Timelock ConfigTimelockController

    Verified structured · 2026-08-30 · Source

  • Risk parameter path

    Controller RISK_ORACLE role / RiskOracleConfig

    Mechanism Allowlisted keys for enabled markets

    Timelock Unknown / none documented

    Verified structured · 2026-08-30 · Source

  • Emergency pause

    Controller Unknown

    Mechanism Unknown

    Timelock Unknown / none documented

    Researched unresolved · 2026-08-30

Governance

Vote / proposal paths — shown separately from immediate operational admin.

  • DAO governance proposals

    Controller GMX DAO (Snapshot → Tally) — governance, not instant ops

    Mechanism Offchain Snapshot then onchain Tally/timelock

    Timelock GovTimelockController

    Verified structured · Source

Protocol & operator surfaces

  • Protocol
    No verified legal name on this surface

    Onchain perpetuals and liquidity markets

    Smart contracts hold funds; logic upgrades via RoleStore

    Verified structured
  • DAO governance
    No verified legal name on this surface

    GMX DAO token governance (Snapshot + Tally)

    Staked GMX mints non-transferable GMX_DAO voting power

    Verified structured
  • Frontend operator
    Legal operator unresolved

    Official app frontend

    Interface separate from bank contracts

    Researched unresolved
  • Developer entity
    Legal operator unresolved

    Protocol development / contributors

    Not equated to DAO or frontend operator in this pack

    Researched unresolved

How are prices determined?

Oracle provider presence is not a claim that the oracle is secure or endorsed.

Primary oracle
Chainlink Data Streams (ChainlinkDataStreamProvider)
Price / index construction
Min/max price reports; optional reference feed deviation check
Fallback
StaticOracleProvider for configured static prices
Update mechanism
Keeper fetches signed prices at execution
Dependencies
Chainlink Data Streams · Keeper network
Last verified
2026-08-30 · Verified structured

Source

What happens if margin falls too low?

Liquidation mechanics in plain language — not a guarantee of user outcomes.

Maintenance / trigger
Remaining collateral after losses/fees/capped negative impact below market minimum collateral (≈0.25%–1% of size)
Partial / full
Liquidation closes position; ADL may partially/fully reduce profitable positions
Liquidator / keeper
Keepers via LiquidationHandler
Liquidation fee
0.20%–0.45% of position notional by market type
Insurance / backstop
ADL when pending PnL / pool value exceeds MAX_PNL_FACTOR_FOR_ADL — not a traditional insurance fund
Bad debt handling
UNKNOWN — no standalone bad-debt fund documentation in pack; ADL is solvency protection

Insurance or buffer existence is not a solvency guarantee. · Verified structured

Who is on the other side of the trade?

Counterparty models differ by protocol — not every perpetual DEX shares the same structure.

LP VAULT (GM / GLV market tokens)

Counterparty Liquidity providers in market pools

Traders vs pool; frozen orders protect against liquidity gaming

Verified structured

Fees

Snapshot mechanisms and rates where documented. Not labeled cheapest or best value. Funding ≠ borrow unless documented.

  • position open close0.04% or 0.06% of position size (market-dependent)2026-08-30 · Verified structured · Source
  • borrowVariable borrow fee while position open (utilization-driven)2026-08-30 · Verified structured · Source
  • fundingVariable long/short imbalance funding (UI shows live rate)2026-08-30 · Verified structured · Source
  • liquidation0.20%–0.45% of notional by market type (standard / single-token / high-vol)market_type · 2026-08-30 · Verified structured · Source
  • execution feeUser-paid keeper gas buffer (excess refunded)2026-08-30 · Verified structured · Source

Funding and borrow are separate mechanisms per GMX fee docs. Live rates are market-variable — not snapshotted as fixed numbers.

Market coverage

Only officially supported classes from primary evidence. Presence is not a recommendation.

  • CryptoSupported
  • FXNot listed
  • CommoditiesNot listed
  • IndicesNot listed
  • StocksNot listed
  • ETFsNot listed

Crypto perpetuals / GM markets per official docs scope researched

Security evidence

Smart-contract audits are not financial audits. No combined “audited” badge. No security score.

Additional audit evidence not yet fully cataloged in this pack — not a negative security judgment.

Smart-contract audits

  • Provider not structuredDate unknown · Official contracts docs warn some readers/events may be outside audit scopes — catalog not exhaustively structured hereVerified not structuredSource

Material incidents

None structured in this pack (not a claim that none occurred).

Access surfaces

Protocol access, frontend access, and terms eligibility are separate. Not “available globally” unless evidenced.

  • Protocol access

    Permissionless contract interaction where network access exists — not the same as legal eligibility.

    Verified not structuredSource
  • Frontend access

    Official frontend geo / ToS restrictions remain RESEARCHED_UNRESOLVED in this pack (not asserted from protocol alone).

    Researched unresolved
  • Terms of service

    Frontend ToS eligibility language not structured in this pack.

    Researched unresolved
  • Legal eligibility

    No regulatory authorization conclusion asserted from protocol architecture.

    Researched unresolved

Direct answers

  • How does GMX work?

    Users submit onchain requests via ExchangeRouter; keepers execute with signed oracle prices against bank vaults and GM/GLV liquidity.

    Verified structured · Source

  • Is GMX non-custodial?

    Collateral sits in protocol bank smart contracts (smart-contract custody), not a centralized exchange wallet. That is not the same as zero custody risk.

    Verified structured · Source

  • Who controls GMX contracts?

    Privileged actions are gated by RoleStore; config uses ConfigTimelockController; DAO governance uses Snapshot and Tally with GovTimelockController. Exact pause authority remains unresolved in this pack.

    Verified structured · Source

  • What oracle does GMX use?

    Primary documented provider is Chainlink Data Streams, with additional Edge and static providers.

    Verified structured · Source

  • Where is GMX collateral held?

    In bank contracts (e.g. DepositVault, OrderVault, market banks). Logic upgrades do not migrate those funds.

    Verified structured · Source

What does this DEX depend on?

Material dependencies only. Dependency count is not a risk score.

  • BlockchainArbitrum (primary researched)Settlement and bank custody
  • OracleChainlink Data StreamsExecution prices
  • KeeperOracle and order keepersRequest fulfillment
  • GovernanceRoleStore / timelocksAdmin and upgrades

Contracts (primary-sourced)

  • DataStore (Arbitrum): 0xFD70de6b91282D8017aA4E741e9Ae325CAb992d8 — Protocol state store (permanent address)
  • RoleStore (Arbitrum): 0x3c3d99FD298f679DBC2CEcd132b4eC4d0F5e6e72 — Role-based access control
  • ExchangeRouter (Arbitrum): 0x7dE39FF2e232A2203196788d37e234cF8F1b83f1 — Primary write entry for orders/deposits/withdrawals
  • DepositVault (Arbitrum): 0xF89e77e8Dc11691C9e8757e84aaFbCD8A67d7A55 — Bank contract holding deposit funds
  • ConfigTimelockController (Arbitrum): 0x2Dd99f39f58445CDDC57AA5E0DB2C367335BBD44 — Timelock for Config parameter changes

Open gaps

  • Named legal operator for frontend: LEGAL_OPERATOR_UNRESOLVED
  • Emergency pause controller not fully mapped
  • Exhaustive smart-contract audit catalog not structured
  • Official frontend ToS geo language not structured

Primary sources

DEX Architecture / Control / Custody evidence only. No DEX score. Unresolved states remain unresolved.